Economic analysis of the hottest state-owned enter

Economic analysis of the corruption of state-owned enterprise managers

in recent years, corruption has spread to all corners of society. The corruption of state-owned enterprise managers has become not a rare social phenomenon, ranging from Kan Zhicheng, the party secretary and general manager of the nationally famous capital iron and steel company, to Chu Shi Jian, the chairman of Yunnan Hongtashan group, the "king of Chinese tobacco" and the director of Yuxi cigarette factory, who made the film have superior smooth results, and Zhao Zhongsheng, the director of scrap Department of Angang, etc. The factory directors and operators of enterprises ranging from county offices, township offices and village offices fell in adoration one by one under the skirts of brother Confucius, including the rich Abbot in the poor temple and the money Lord in the rich temple. This has become an ugly phenomenon that cannot be ignored in today's market economy, and also a major public hazard that hinders economic development and causes "public anger". This paper mainly analyzes the reasons for the corruption of state-owned enterprise managers from the perspective of economics

I. the performance of operator corruption and its economic implications

(I) the performance of operator corruption in state-owned enterprises. The corruption of the managers of state-owned enterprises is mainly manifested in the following aspects:

(1) abuse power for personal gain at the expense of the public. There are individual enterprise operators, as Party members and cadres, who are the head of a factory. Taking advantage of the power in their hands and the convenience of their positions, they are unscrupulous, reckless, and engage in money and power transactions, corruption and bribery, and enrich their own pockets. Some openly ask for kickbacks, "do nothing without giving benefits, and do things indiscriminately with benefits"; Some turn the big Duke into the small Duke, privately divide money and goods, and even some individuals turn the enterprise into their own "private plots" and "small coffers", doing whatever they want; Some privately set up accounts to intercept enterprise funds, which not only caused the serious loss of state-owned assets, but also provided a "hotbed" for the breeding of corruption

(2) bureaucracy, dereliction of duty, accepting bribes. The cooling circuit is not properly designed. A few enterprise operators have serious bureaucratic thoughts, blindly use their management and decision-making power, do not seriously investigate and study major problems in production and operation, do not speak of democracy, be subjective and arbitrary, have a hot head, and make decisions by taking it for granted. As a result, they often cause major economic losses to enterprises, and make a good enterprise lose money or even close down. There are also a few people who accept bribes. They not only accept money from business customers, but also reach out to the majority of employees. For small things at work, employees have to give gifts to them. Even their own weddings and funerals, employees are not spared

(3) extravagance, waste, corruption and degeneration. Under the guise of invigorating the economy, some enterprise operators are ostentatious, ostentatious and generous in enterprise business activities. Some are not willing to work, are keen to welcome and send, and give gifts to each other. Some are corrupt, willing to degenerate, and use public funds to eat, drink, whore and gamble; Some use public funds to travel abroad in the name of visiting and inspecting, wasting the sweat and blood of workers; What's more, no matter whether the enterprise is profitable or not, whether the workers are paid or laid off, they think that they don't make money when they are on duty, and use public funds to buy houses, cars, decorate houses, buy mobile phones, etc. for themselves and a few responsible persons, in pursuit of personal pleasure

(4) kinship management, taking advantage of the opportunity to embezzle. A small number of enterprise operators have evolved state and collective enterprises into "family factories" and "family companies", especially after the decentralization of state-owned enterprises, they are even more determined to act regardless of the leadership of the party, and the Democratic opinions of the masses are not listened to, as if the factories and enterprises were run by him, he can do whatever he wants. Put their relatives in various key departments. In this way, it gives a green light for their corruption. With this relationship, their greedy occupation is more hidden and legalized. In the name of working for the public, they engage in transactions in private, get their own way, and cause damage to the state, collectives, and workers. Wait

(II) the economic meaning of the corruption of state-owned enterprise managers. Corruption has been defined from many perspectives. We believe that the corruption of state-owned enterprise managers can be defined as the expansion of opportunistic behavior from the perspective of institutional economics. The reasons are: the state-owned assets belong to the people of the whole country, and it is impossible for the people of the whole country to directly operate them. Moreover, even if it is possible, it is economically inefficient, because the cost of unanimous decision-making is too high (Buchanan, 1989). Therefore, the people will entrust the management right of state-owned assets to each operator in the form of a certain contract through layers of entrustment, in order to maximize the appreciation and preservation of state-owned assets through their activities. In principle, the operator, as the agent, has truly achieved the multi-purpose of one machine. The manager should faithfully perform his duties for the maximization of the interests of the client, that is, the people of the country, and properly exercise the power granted by the client. But it is difficult for him to do so. Because he is not only an economic subject pursuing his own interests, but also a representative of public interests. This combination of dual identities makes it easy for him to blur the boundary between the two roles and infringe on the interests of the people in order to maximize his personal interests. This is exactly an important manifestation of opportunistic behavior in institutional economics

"opportunism" is no stranger to us, and it can be found in many social science documents. Before the western new institutional economics was known by Chinese scholars, people's understanding of it was mostly obtained from the party history and the literature about socialism. For example, "left opportunism", "Right opportunism", etc. In recent years, with the rapid spread of Western New Institutional Economics in China, people's understanding of opportunism has further advanced. Opportunism in economics is a basic assumption of human nature, which was first proposed by American economist Williamson. He believes that people have the tendency to be flexible, opportunistic and seek benefits for themselves. This hypothesis is a supplement to the hypothesis of economic man in classical economics, so as to make it closer to economic reality, so that economics becomes "the kind of economics it should be" (Coase, 1996)

people put forward the definition of opportunistic behavior based on Williamson's human nature hypothesis. The more authoritative definition in China was put forward by Dr. Fan Gang. He believes that the opportunistic power switch using special switch behavior is "refers to the behavior of the parties seeking personal interests with false or empty, that is, untrue threats and commitments". Wangdingding defines opportunistic behavior as "the behavior of one or both parties to the contract that violates the contract due to the emergence of new opportunities". In his book "modern enterprise innovation", Professor Chang Xiuze believes that opportunistic behavior refers to people seeking self-interest with the help of improper means